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A Case for a Well-Defined Negative Marxian Exploitation
Djordje Suvakovic Olgin*
Abstract
Karl Marx's exploitation theory, based on his notion of surplus value, 
is re-examined. It is found that in profitable economies w ithout joint
production the Marxian exploitation, as measured by the surplus value
index, may be negative, its algebraic value being show n to depend on
the timing of wage payments, specified by the labour contract. The
implications for Marx's doctrine are discussed.
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Perhaps the most discussed topic in the economic writings of Karl Marx 
has been his doctrine of surplus value (Marx, 1976; 1969). Its double 
nature  of a theory of interest or profit and of an exploitation theory 
attracts, in one way or another, scholars' attention for more than  a 
century.
Yet, it seems that one curious though basic property of M arx's 
surplus value accounts has so far remained unnoticed. It reduces to 
the insight that the m agnitude of surplus value, and sometimes also 
its algebraic sign, depends on a convention, i. e., on the timing of 
wage payments specified by the labour contract.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section I we demonstrate 
that, due to the postulated ex-ante wage payment, Marx miscalculated 
his commodity value, designed to express the revalued am ount of labour 
historically used up in production of a particular good. The algorithm 
for com puting value under alternative methods of wage payment is 
presented in section II. In section III M arx's surplus value 
exploitation theory, focusing on the outcome of the embodied labour 
exchange between workers and capitalists, is expounded. A correction 
of the related Marxian computations is then made, show ing tha t in this 
exchange the workers' net labour appropriation may be positive. The 
implications of this result for Marx's doctrine are discussed in 
section IV. Section V summarises.
For the sake of simplicity we consider a model of the one-sector 
economy. The extension to a multi-sector case is straightforw ard, and 
will only be performed in deriving conditions for emergence of 
negative workers' exploitation. This is relegated to the Appendix.
I. THE EVIDENCE ON COMPUTATION OF VALUE
In the opening chapter of Capital Marx presents the definition of 
value:
(i) All these things now tell us is that ... hum an labour is




























































































... they are values (Marx, 1976, p. 128, emphasis added)
After that Marx goes on to elaborate on the value formula. Here, he 
shows to be aware of the fact that the determination of the magnitude 
of value is not merely a matter of definition, bu t also of correct 
computation:
( i i )  We know tha t value ... is determined by the labour
materialized in [the commodityl, by the labour-time
socially necessary to produce it. O ur first step is to
calculate the quantity of labour objectified in it (Marx,
1976, p. 293, emphasis added)
Then Marx turns to calculation and finally concludes:
( i i i  ) All the labour contained in the [commodityl is past 
labour-, and it is a matter of no importance that the 
labour expended to produce its constituent elements lies 
further back in the past than the labour expended on the 
final process ... The former stands, as it were, in the 
pluperfect, the latter in the perfect tense, but this does 
no t matter. The values of the means of production are 
therefore the constituent parts . . .  of the value of the 
product (Marx, 1976, pp. 294-95, emphasis added)
Quotations (i)-(iii) thus show the value to be identified with the 
revalued labour historically expended for producing the commodity and, 
in this sense, objectified, materialised, contained or, as put 
elsewhere, embodied in it.
It appears, however, that the computation performed in ( i i i )  was 
somewhat premature. After completing the value accounts Marx begins to 
introduce in the (so far) technocratic environment his vision of the 
capitalist mode of production, summarising the conditions for its 
emergence as follows:




























































































production and subsistence finds the free worker 
available, on the market, as the seller of his own 
labour-power (Marx, 1976, p. 274, emphasis added)
The proposition thus implies that workers are paid ou t of capital, 
getting presumably the subsistence before providing the labour input,
i. e., at the begining of the production period. This also fits in 
w ith the cited axiom that, instead of selling labour services, workers 
sell their labour power or their capacity to work. In fact, after a 
couple of pages Marx explicitly states:
(v) It will therefore be useful, if we w ant to conceive the 
relation in its pure form, to presuppose ... that the 
possessor of labour-power, on the occasion of each sale, 
immediately receives the price stipulated under contract 
(Marx, 1976, p. 279, emphasis added)
The notion of variable capital, i. e., of wage goods as advances to 
production, follows from (iv) and (v).
Nevertheless, in spite of the existence of variable capital, the 
computation of value as the past labour embodied in the commodity 
ended without inclusion of the labour contained in the pre-existing 
means of subsistence which, by the assumption, and like the labour 
embodied in the pre-existing means of production, was surely expended 
in the pluperfect of quotation (Hi).
However, a little later we find out tha t Marx did no t fail to 
notice the expenditure of this labour quantity:
(vi) The portion of the capital invested in the purchase of 
labour-power is a definite quantity of objectified labour, 
a constant value like the value of the labour-power 
purchased (Marx, 1976. p. 322, emphasis added)
Indeed, after labelling the living or perfect tense labour, supplied 
by workers, the new value, Marx tried to eliminate the labour embodied 




























































































a revision of the just completed value accounts:
(v ii)  Of course, we do not forget that this new value only 
replaces the money advanced by the capitalist in 
purchasing the labour-power and spent by the worker on 
the means of subsistence. With regard to the (money! 
expended, the new value appears merely as a reproduction. 
Nevertheless, it is a re a l reproduction and no t, as in the 
case of the means of production, simply an  apparent one 
(Marx, 1976, p. 316, emphasis added)
After consulting a few related passages (Marx, 1976, pp. 315-16, 
322) it appears tha t M arx's explanation on excluding the labour 
contained in wage advances from the value accounts runs as follows.
The value of the means of production, i. e., the labour contained
in the pre-existing material inputs undergoes transmigration, i.e., it 
is transferred to the new product, because its consumption is 
productive, in which case there is no consumption of value. Hence, 
this part of labour enters the calculation.
On the other hand, the value of labour power, i. e., the labour
contained in the pre-existing wage goods, is not transferred - for 
unclear reasons, bu t presumably because the w orkers’ consumption is 
not productive. The result is that this part of value, i. e., of past
labour, has to he reproduced, i. e., replaced by a portion of living 
labour - as in quotation (vii) - being thus eliminated from the value 
accounts.
In a well-known apology for the labour value doctrine Hilferding 
(1949, p. 179) briefly repeats the described procedure of Marx. As 
regards later expositions of the Capital Volume I value formula, 
instead of being deleted, the "extra" labour term was probably
overlooked, perhaps with the help of Marx’s repetitive rhetorics about 
the value of labour power as an integral part of new value.
In summary, we conclude that in order to arrive at the proper
outcome of the value accounts, we must appraise the fact that the past 
labour contained in the pre-existing wage goods advanced by




























































































in common w ith (a part of) the living labour currently supplied by 
workers.
II. THE MAGNITUDE OF VALUE AND THE TIMING OF WAGE PAYMENTS
We consider a one-sector economy w ith homogeneous labour, circulating 
capital, and no technical choice. The production process is of the 
point-input-point-output type, exhibibiting constant returns to scale, 
and using no primary inputs other than labour. The period of 
production is taken as the time unit, and there exists a corresponding 
perfectly competitive commodity market. The labour is in excess supply 
and wage is determined at the minimum-of-subsistence level.
In the model appears a single labour-input coefficient a and a real 
wage b, w ith B = ba being the w age-input coefficient. Furthermore, 
there is a m aterial-input coefficient A, and a coresponding
augm ented-input coefficient A* =  A + B. The latter is assumed to be 
smaller than  unity, i. e., the economy is capable of provising 
positive profit or interest.
1. The Ex-Post Wage Payment
If wages are paid post factum there are no wage goods supplied by 
capitalists for starting production, i. e., there is no variable 
capital.
As a consequence, and using the adopted notation, the econom y's 
rate of profits, rc, amounts to:
A
where A of the denominator represents the capital invested per unit of 
the commodity. Thus the capital reduces to Marx’s constant capital, 
identified w ith the advanced material inputs or means of production, 
and equal, under the assumptions made, with the expended amounts of 
these inputs.
Now, due to the ex-post wage payment, the capitalistic production 
of the good of period t only requires previous formation of material 




























































































the commodity consists of the labour expended in t-1, which is at _ ,, 
plus the labour previously expended for providing for the means of 
production that had to be available a t the begining of t-1 . Thus, the 
labour expended in t-2  is, w ith the obvious notation, - 2 ^t - 1 < that 
expended in t- 3  is at-3Ai-zAt-u and so on, infinitely backward in 
time. The series of these labour terms may be w ritten as:
l h istorie 
"ex-post Ì J *
k = 2 m= 2
1 ( 2 )
which is the labour historically embodied in the commodity.
Following Marx - see quotation (il) and note 1 - we now revalue all 
the inputs according to the present-day conditions of production:
a t-k = a t ' ^t-k+m-1 At ; k = 1,2..... oo (3)
= a = A m — 1
The substitution of (3) into (2) then yields the socially necessary 
labour embodied in the commoditiy1, or the commodity value:
.reva 1ued 
"ex-post
= a l l  -  d f 1 (2a)
= h
- a + hA
= a + a£ A* 
k = l
Finally, we note that in (2a) the value is represented as the 
(revalued) sum of living and past labour, a and hA, respectively, or, 
strictly speaking, of perfect tense and pluperfect tense labour - see
quotation ( i i i )  - where the latter reduces to the labour embodied in
material inputs2
It appears that in "unMarxist" case of wages being paid ou t of
revenue the original value accounts can stand on its own feet. By 
verifying this, we now turn  to the most often discussed "pure" case of 





























































































2. The Ex-Ante Wage Payment




where in the denominator appear the material inputs, A, and the means 
of subsistence, B, advanced per unit of the commodity. Thus the
capital consists of Marx’s constant and variable capital. i
As far as the computation of the historic labour content of the 
commodity is concerned, this has the following implication. -K
In addition to the formation of material inputs, the capitalistic yi 
production of the commodity produced in t-1 and available in t, now V? 
also requires previous formation of wage goods. Of course, the labour 
expended in t-1 is, as with the ex-post wage payment, a t _ ,. But in t-2 f 
the labour had to be performed both for the formation of material
inputs and of wage goods, since the latter, like the former, had to be 
supplied at the beginning of t-1. This means that, using self-evident
notation, the labour used up in t-2 is tha t expended
in t-3  is a t - 3 (/1t - 2 + Bt - 2 )('1t - i + and so on, ad infinitum. The
historic labour costs therefore reduce to:
wages the rate of profits assumes the 
1 - (A + B)
^historic 
nex-ante at - i + [ at-k [( (^t-k + m-l
k=2
(5)
Let us now revalue the material and labour inputs as in (3), and let 
us do the same with the historically expended wage goods:
Jc = 1 , 2 , . . .  , »
m = 1
Substituting (3) and (6) into (5) we then obtain the am ount of 

































































































=  a  + a £  (il ♦ B)k
k=l
= 4 1 -  M + B ) ] '1
where:
= h*
h* = a + h*(A + B)
(5a)
( 8 )
Following Marx, h* may be labelled the augmented value of good.
Thus equation (8) shows the commodity’s correct embodied labour 
requirem ent to consist of Marx’s living labour, a, as well as of the 
revalued labour historically embodied In the material inputs, h* A, and 
in the wage goods, h*B.
III. THE VARYING ALGEBRAIC SIGN OF SURPLUS VALUE
The dependence of the m agnitude of value on the timing of wage 
payments, however curious, would be of limited interest to the reader 
of Marx were it not to have the impact on the computation of surplus 
value and, thus, on his theory of exploitation.
1. Surplus Labour and Surplus Value
As a preliminary, we note that Marx's exploitation theory based on the 
notion of surplus value is not the only exploitation doctrine of his. 
There is also another, based on his concept of surplus labour. 
Although Marx's surplus labour doctrine is not focused on here, in 
order not to be confused with the surplus value theory, it seems 
appropriate to give a brief exposition of it.
According to the surplus labour doctrine, the exploitation under 
capitalism occurs if the worker performs more labour-time for a given 
physical wage than he would have to do under some equally efficient 
hypothetical regime where there is no need for producing commodities 
other than those entering the wage. The difference between the actual 




























































































called surplus labour (see Marx, 1976, pp. 324-25).
Unlike the surplus labour doctrine, the surplus value theory 
compares the two labour quantities performed w ithin the same 
institutional enviromnent. According to it, exploitation occurs if the 
am ount of current labour the worker supplies in a given capitalist 
economy happens to be greater than  the revalued amount of labour 
actually historically expended, within the same economy, in the 
capitalistic production of his real wage, and in this sense embodied 
in it. At the same time, the difference betw een the two labour 
amounts, which are respectively referred to as the new value and the 
value of labour power, is called surplus value.
Marx's view on the outcome of the above labour exchange is perhaps 
best summarised in the context of his explanation of the origin of 
profits, which includes the statem ent of the surplus value formula. 
Thus in Volume I of Capital we read:
(viii) But the past labour embodied in the labour-power and the 
living labour it can perform ... are two totally
different things ... and this difference was w hat the 
capitalist had in mind when he was purchasing the 
labour-power (Marx, 1976, p. 300)
In Part II of Theories of Surplus Value we can find, in somewhat 
different wording, the same proposition:
(ix) The enrichment of the capitalist only arises from the fact 
that in the production process he appropriates more labour 
than he has expended in wages (Marx, 1969, p. 323)
Within the surplus labour doctrine the determ ination of algebraic 
value of exploitation is a matter of f i a t 3. And this is w hy in this 
case we cannot speak about the existence of a corresponding theory of 
exploitation.
However, things are different with the surplus value paradigm, 
where both the m agnitude and the algebraic sign of exploitation 




























































































value is a precondition for determinig surplus value, quotation ( i i i )  
implies that Marx is not to deny this property of the surplus value
doctrine. Nevertheless, his computations led him to conclude that 
workers are regularly exploited under capitalism, in the sense that 
the current labour each of them performs, T = 1, is always greater
than the revalued past labour embodied in the real wage, L. In other 
words, Marx held tha t his surplus value index T-L is regularly greater 
than  zero.
In w hat follows we examine w hether Marx was correct on this
supposed universal positiveness of T-L, or situations may also arise 
w hen T is smaller than  L, i. e., when, by Marxian criteria, workers
are exploiting capitalists through unequal labour exchange4.
2. The Surplus Value under Ex-Post Wage Payment
With the ex-post wage payment the past labour contained in the wage, 
i. e., the value of labour power, is reckoned on the basis of (2a), 
and amounts to:
L = hb (2b)
The surplus value therefore is:
surplus value = T - L
= 1 - hb (9)
1 -  A
Thus if the wage is paid post factum the positiveness of the rate of 
profits of (1) implies the positiveness of surplus value, i. e., the 
negativeness of w orker’s net labour appropriation.
3. The Surplus Value under Ex-Ante Wage Payment
With the ex-ante wage payment we calculate the labour embodied in the 
wage using (5a):




























































































Hence, the surplus value index is:
surplus value * T - L
= 1 -  h*b (10)
_ 1 -  (A + ZB)
1 -  A
Obviously, the positiveness of of the rate of profits - see eq. (4) - 
no longer ensures the positiveness of surplus value, the algebraic 
sign of which now depends on the m agnitude of material and wage 
input-coefficient.
Let us now represent the surplus value of (10) in the form which 
also covers the case of several industries. In order to do that, we 
rewrite (8) as:
h* (1 - A )  = (1 + h*b)a (11)
and m u ltip ly  (11) by (1 - 4)”1 to obtain:
h* = (1 + h*b)h (12)
Multiplying (12) by b and solving for hb we have:
h*b = hb
1 -  hb
(13)
= L
Thus the labour content of a given physical wage paid before starting 
production is expressed as a function of hb, i. e., as a function of 
the labour contained in the same wage basket in the case w hen the wage 
is paid post factum - see eq. (2b).
It appears tha t with the ex-ante payment of wages the am ount of 




























































































T - L = 1 hb
_ 1 -  2hb 
1 -  hb
This is show n to be positive as long as hb falls short of one half of 
the labour unit. However, if hb happens to be above that maginitude, 
it is the workers’ net labour appropriation tha t becomes positive,
which denotes the case of a well-defined negative Marxian exploitation 
- see footnote 4 and the related part of the text. As already
announced, these conclusions are not altered in a multi-commodity 
framework - cf. equation (4A) of the Appendix.
IV. THE SURPLUS VALUE THEORY: A DISCUSSION
Since the above analysis modifies our view of the surplus value
doctrine, a few comments seem to be appropriate here.
First, we note the revealed possibility of coexistence of positive 
profits and negative workers’ exploitation in the Marxian system. It 
is widely recognised that Marx regarded his surplus value as the
causal antecedent of profits in capitalist economies. However, it is
now also well understood5 that the surplus value concept is not able 
to perform this task in a meaningful way. In some reconstructions of 
Marxist argum ent a revision of Marx’ s claim has therefore been
proposed, being represented by the so-called Fundamental Marxian 
Theorem on Exploitation6.
The theorem asserts that in the absence of joint production the 
positive exploitation of workers is necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of positive profit or interest. Whatever the interest in 
such an equivalence relation, it is now seen that, as long as 
exploitation is measured by the surplus value index, i e . , defined by 
the outcome of the embodied labour exchange between workers and 
capitalists, the theorem does not necessarily hold.
The second comment concerns the possibility of negative




























































































of profits. Indeed, such a possibility constitutes a problem for
Marx’ s theory in so far as it contradicts his view of inherently 
inferior position of wage earners under the stylised picture of a 
two-class capitalist economy.
To this it should however be added that problems of the surplus 
value doctrine do not end w ith the occurence of negative
w orkers'exploitation. In fact, its most serious difficulty is that the 
negative exploitation may be turned into the positive one, and vice 
versa, by a mere change of the point of the production period in which 
wages are assumed to be paid. The choice of this point is, of course, 
of no t more than  conventional character, and it was an unfortunate 
decision of Marx to build a theory which basic conclusions may so vary 
with it.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has re-examined the foundations of Karl M arx's exploitation 
theory based on his concept of surplus value.
It has been first shown that, due to the postulated ex - an te  wage 
payment, Marx's value formula of Capital Volume I contains the error 
to the effect that it significantly underestimates the goods' revalued 
historic labour contents.
After that the surplus value has been traditionally defined as the 
difference betw een the current labour supplied by workers, and the 
revalued labour historically embodied in the wage goods supplied by 
capitalists. It has then been demonstrated tha t w ith M arx's assumption 
of wages being paid ou t of capital this surplus value may be negative. 
It was found, finally, that the ex-post wage payment ensures the 
negativeness of workers' net labour appropriation, i. e., the
positiveness of surplus value.
It has thus emerged tha t the algebraic sign of exploitation may 
depend on the selected point of the production period in which wages 
are assumed to be paid, i. e., on the choice which is a m atter of pure 
convention. Classified in the history of economics as a misleading 
profit or interest theory, the surplus value doctrine of Marx thus 





























































































In this Appendix we show how to calculate surplus value in a 
multi-sector economy, assuming the ex-an te  wage payment.
The only difference in the computation, as compared w ith the 
starting equation of the one-sector model - eq. (5) - is that, instead 
of scalars a, b, A, and B, we now use vectors a and b, as well as 
matrices A and B, defined as follows: a is the positive labour-input 
coefficients vector, lxn; b is the semipositive real wage vector, nxl; 
A is the nonnegative and connected material-input coefficients matrix, 
nxn; B = ba is the w age-input coefficients matrix; A*= A + B is the 
productive matrix of augm ented-input coefficients.
Consequently, the goods' historic labour contents are represented 
by the following vector series - cf. the corresponding scalar series 
of eq. (5):
«historic
•"ex-ante £  at-k J] (At-k-i-ni-i -k + m-1) (1A)
where on the left-hand side appears the (row-)vector of historic 
labour costs associated with particular commodities.
Revaluing the historically expended material and wage inputs, as in 
(3) and (6), we obtain the amounts of socially necessary labour 
embodied in particular commodities, i. e, the vector of correct values 




= a + a£ (A
k = 1
B)k
= a [I -  (A ♦ B)] (2A)
= h*
= a + h* (A + B)
It now follows that the revalued labour embodied in the wage bundle 
b is h*b. At the same time, the analogous procedure shows that under 




























































































a(I - A ) '1 is the (row-)vector of M arx's original values - this vector 
often appears in discussions of Marxian economics (for some references 
see footnote 2).
The relation between the two labour quantities is obtained using a 
full analogy w ith the scalar calculations of (11) and (12), and 
appears to be identical w ith the one-sector relation of (13):
h*b = —^ —  (3A)
1 -  hb
Thus the surplus value formula obtained in the one-commodity framework 
- see eq. (14) - still holds good in a multi-sector economy:
1 -  2hb 
1 -  hb
(4A)
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1. For the definition of socially necessary labour see Marx (1976, p. 
129):
Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time 
requiredto produce any use value under the conditions of 
production normal for a given society.
2. For the definition of value and the multi-sector version of (2a) 
see, for example, Brody (1970, pp. 26-28), Morishima (1973, pp. 11, 
13-15), Morishima and Catephores (1978, pp. 34-35). See also Meek 
(1973, p. xvlil), where the definition is not accompanied by the 
mathematical formula.
3. In the presence of joint production, an awkward phenom enon for 
M arx's labour accounting, the strict positiveness of surplus labour 
cannot be ensured even in such a way. See, for example, Roemer (1981, 
pp. 49-50).
4. Indeed, this conclusion would directly follow from w hat may be 
considered to be the general Marxian definition of exploitation, based 
on Marx's statem ents of the type given in quotations (v i i i )  and (lx). 
Thus in Hollander (1982, p. 871) we read (cf. also Roemer, 1981, p. 
206):
Any agent is defined to expioit his transaction partner if 
the ...labour appropriated from the latter exceeds 
the am ount supplied
5. Largely due to the early critique by Dmitriev (1974) and to the 
refinements and extensions of his argum ent by such writers as Seton 
(1957), Samuelson (1971), and Steedman (1977).
6. See, for example, Morishima (1973, p. 6), Morishima and Catephores 
(1978, p. 38), Roemer (1981, p. 16). For a history of the proof of 
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